Results for 'Erik J. Wielenburg'

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  1. Aristotelian love-making.Erik J. Wielenburg - 2011 - In Adrianne Leigh McEvoy (ed.), Sex, Love, and Friendship: Studies of the Society for the Philosophy of Sex and Love, 1993-2003. New York, NY: Rodopi.
     
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  2.  71
    Sceptical theism and divine lies: ERIK J. WIELENBERG.Erik J. Wielenberg - 2010 - Religious Studies 46 (4):509-523.
    In this paper I develop a novel challenge for sceptical theists. I present a line of reasoning that appeals to sceptical theism to support scepticism about divine assertions. I claim that this reasoning is at least as plausible as one popular sceptical theistic strategy for responding to evidential arguments from evil. Thus, I seek to impale sceptical theists on the horns of a dilemma: concede that either sceptical theism implies scepticism about divine assertions, or the sceptical theistic strategy for responding (...)
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  3. On the evolutionary debunking of morality.Erik J. Wielenberg - 2010 - Ethics 120 (3):441-464.
    Evolutionary debunkers of morality hold this thesis: If S’s moral belief that P can be given an evolutionary explanation, then S’s moral belief that P is not knowledge. In this paper, I debunk a variety of arguments for this thesis. I first sketch a possible evolutionary explanation for some human moral beliefs. Next, I explain how, given a reliabilist approach to warrant, my account implies that humans possess moral knowledge. Finally, I examine the debunking arguments of Michael Ruse, Sharon Street, (...)
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  4.  94
    Value and Virtue in a Godless Universe.Erik J. Wielenberg - 2005 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
    Suppose there is no God. This might imply that human life is meaningless, that there are no moral obligations and hence people can do whatever they want, and that the notions of virtue and vice and good and evil have no place. Erik J. Wielenberg believes this view to be mistaken and in this book he explains why. He argues that even if God does not exist, human life can have meaning, we do have moral obligations, and virtue is (...)
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  5. Against coherence: truth, probability, and justification.Erik J. Olsson - 2005 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    It is tempting to think that, if a person's beliefs are coherent, they are also likely to be true. This truth conduciveness claim is the cornerstone of the popular coherence theory of knowledge and justification. Erik Olsson's new book is the most extensive and detailed study of coherence and probable truth to date. Setting new standards of precision and clarity, Olsson argues that the value of coherence has been widely overestimated. Provocative and readable, Against Coherence will make stimulating reading (...)
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  6. In Defense of Non-Natural, Non-Theistic Moral Realism.Erik J. Wielenberg - 2009 - Faith and Philosophy 26 (1):23-41.
    Many believe that objective morality requires a theistic foundation. I maintain that there are sui generis objective ethical facts that do not reduce to natural or supernatural facts. On my view, objective morality does not require an external foundation of any kind. After explaining my view, I defend it against a variety of objections posed by William Wainwright, William Lane Craig, and J. P. Moreland.
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  7. Omnipotence Again.Erik J. Wielenberg - 2000 - Faith and Philosophy 17 (1):26-47.
    One of the cornerstones of western theology is the doctrine of divine omnipotence. God is traditionally conceived of as an omnipotent or all-powerful being. However, satisfactory analyses of omnipotence are notoriously elusive. In this paper, I first consider some simple attempts to analyze omnipotence, showing how each fails. I then consider two more sophisticated accounts of omnipotence. The first of these is presented by Edward Wierenga; the second by Thomas Flint and Alfred Freddoso. I argue that both of these accounts (...)
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  8.  55
    A Simulation Approach to Veritistic Social Epistemology.Erik J. Olsson - 2011 - Episteme 8 (2):127-143.
    In a seminal book, Alvin I. Goldman outlines a theory for how to evaluate social practices with respect to their “veritistic value”, i.e., their tendency to promote the acquisition of true beliefs in society. In the same work, Goldman raises a number of serious worries for his account. Two of them concern the possibility of determining the veritistic value of a practice in a concrete case because we often don't know what beliefs are actually true, and even if we did, (...)
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  9.  58
    In Defense of Pure Reason: A Rationalist Account of a priori Justification.Erik J. Olsson - 1998 - Erkenntnis 49 (2):243-249.
  10. Gettier and the method of explication: a 60 year old solution to a 50 year old problem.Erik J. Olsson - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (1):57-72.
    I challenge a cornerstone of the Gettier debate: that a proposed analysis of the concept of knowledge is inadequate unless it entails that people don’t know in Gettier cases. I do so from the perspective of Carnap’s methodology of explication. It turns out that the Gettier problem per se is not a fatal problem for any account of knowledge, thus understood. It all depends on how the account fares regarding other putative counter examples and the further Carnapian desiderata of exactness, (...)
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  11.  31
    Coherence Theories of Epistemic Justification.Erik J. Olsson - 2017 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  12.  36
    Coherentist Theories of Epistemic Justification.Erik J. Olsson - 2012 - The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  13.  54
    A simulation approach to veritistic social epistemology.Erik J. Olsson - 2011 - Episteme 8 (2):127-143.
    In a seminal book, Alvin I. Goldman outlines a theory for how to evaluate social practices with respect to their , i.e., their tendency to promote the acquisition of true beliefs (and impede the acquisition of false beliefs) in society. In the same work, Goldman raises a number of serious worries for his account. Two of them concern the possibility of determining the veritistic value of a practice in a concrete case because (1) we often don't know what beliefs are (...)
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  14. What is the problem of coherence and truth?Erik J. Olsson - 2002 - Journal of Philosophy 99 (5):246-272.
  15.  58
    A Bayesian Simulation Model of Group Deliberation and Polarization.Erik J. Olsson - 2013 - Springer.
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  16. Sceptical Theism and Divine Lies.Erik J. Wielenberg - 2010 - Religious Studies 46 (4):509-523.
    In this paper I develop a novel challenge for sceptical theists. I present a line of reasoning that appeals to sceptical theism to support scepticism about divine assertions. I claim that this reasoning is at least as plausible as one popular sceptical theistic strategy for responding to evidential arguments from evil. Thus, I seek to impale sceptical theists on the horns of a dilemma: concede that either (a) sceptical theism implies scepticism about divine assertions, or (b) the sceptical theistic strategy (...)
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  17.  75
    On the role of the research agenda in epistemic change.Erik J. Olsson & David Westlund - 2006 - Erkenntnis 65 (2):165 - 183.
    The standard way of representing an epistemic state in formal philosophy is in terms of a set of sentences, corresponding to the agent’s beliefs, and an ordering of those sentences, reflecting how well entrenched they are in the agent’s epistemic state. We argue that this wide-spread representational view – a view that we identify as a “Quinean dogma” – is incapable of making certain crucial distinctions. We propose, as a remedy, that any adequate representation of epistemic states must also include (...)
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  18. Norms of assertion and communication in social networks.Erik J. Olsson & Aron Vallinder - 2013 - Synthese 190 (13):2557-2571.
    Epistemologists can be divided into two camps: those who think that nothing short of certainty or (subjective) probability 1 can warrant assertion and those who disagree with this claim. This paper addressed this issue by inquiring into the problem of setting the probability threshold required for assertion in such a way that that the social epistemic good is maximized, where the latter is taken to be the veritistic value in the sense of Goldman (Knowledge in a social world, 1999). We (...)
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  19. A morally unsurpassable God must create the best.Erik J. Wielenberg - 2004 - Religious Studies 40 (1):43-62.
    I present a novel argument for the position that a morally unsurpassable God must create the best world that He has the power to create. I show that grace-based considerations of the sort proposed by Robert Adams neither refute my argument nor establish that a morally unsurpassable God need not create the best. I conclude with a discussion of the implications of my argument for the ‘no-best-world’ response to the problem of evil. (Published Online February 17 2004).
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  20.  24
    Explicating Ignorance and Doubt : A Possible Worlds Approach.Erik J. Olsson & Carlo Proietti - 2016 - In Rik Peels & Martijn Blaauw (eds.), The Epistemic Dimensions of Ignorance. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 81-95.
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  21.  33
    The early modern “creation” of property and its enduring influence.Erik J. Olsen - 2022 - European Journal of Political Theory 21 (1).
    This article redescribes early modern European defenses of private property in terms of a theoretical project of seeking to establish the true or essential nature of property. Most of the scholarly literature has focused on the historical and normative issues relating to the various accounts of original acquisition around which these defenses were organized. However, in my redescription, these so-called “original acquisition stories” appear as methodological devices for an analytic reduction and resolution of property into its fundamental elements and axioms. (...)
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  22.  58
    The Impossibility of Coherence.Erik J. Olsson - 2005 - Erkenntnis 63 (3):387-412.
    There is an emerging consensus in the literature on probabilistic coherence that such coherence cannot be truth conducive unless the information sources providing the cohering information are individually credible and collectively independent. Furthermore, coherence can at best be truth conducive in a ceteris paribus sense. Bovens and Hartmann have argued that there cannot be any measure of coherence that is truth conducive even in this very weak sense. In this paper, I give an alternative impossibility proof. I provide a relatively (...)
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  23. The parent–child analogy and the limits of skeptical theism.Erik J. Wielenberg - 2015 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 78 (3):301-314.
    I draw on the literature on skeptical theism to develop an argument against Christian theism based on the widespread existence of suffering that appears to its sufferer to be gratuitous and is combined with the sense that God has abandoned one or never existed in the first place. While the core idea of the argument is hardly novel, key elements of the argument are importantly different from other influential arguments against Christian theism. After explaining that argument, I make the case (...)
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  24. Reliabilism, Stability, and the Value of Knowledge.Erik J. Olsson - 2007 - American Philosophical Quarterly 44 (4):343 - 355.
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  25. Value and Virtue in a Godless Universe.Erik J. Wielenberg - 2005 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 59 (3):179-182.
     
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  26. A Naturalistic Approach to the Generality Problem.Erik J. Olsson - 2016 - In Hilary Kornblith & Brian McLaughlin (eds.), Goldman and his Critics. Malden, MA: Blackwell. pp. 178–199.
    This chapter considers the present account to be a sufficient response to the generality problem as an objection that specifically targets reliabilism. It identifies the main challenge for reliabilism in relation to the typing of belief‐forming processes. The chapter focuses on insights in cognitive science in a way that should make this response attractive to practitioners of naturalized epistemology, including Goldman himself. The most stimulating part of Conee and Feldman's attack can charitably be viewed as targeting the notion that the (...)
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  27.  74
    Euthyphro and Moral Realism: A Reply to Harrison.Erik J. Wielenberg - 2016 - Sophia 55 (3):437-449.
    Gerald Harrison identifies two Euthyphro-related concerns for divine command theories and makes the case that to the extent that these concerns make trouble for divine command theories they also make trouble for non-naturalistic moral realism and naturalistic moral realism. He also offers responses to the two concerns on behalf of divine command theorists. I show here that the parity thesis does not hold for the most commonly discussed version of divine command theory. I further argue that his responses to the (...)
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  28.  62
    Reliability conducive measures of coherence.Erik J. Olsson & Stefan Schubert - 2007 - Synthese 157 (3):297-308.
    A measure of coherence is said to be truth conducive if and only if a higher degree of coherence (as measured) results in a higher likelihood of truth. Recent impossibility results strongly indicate that there are no (non-trivial) probabilistic coherence measures that are truth conducive. Indeed, this holds even if truth conduciveness is understood in a weak ceteris paribus sense (Bovens & Hartmann, 2003, Bayesian epistemology. New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press; Olsson, 2005, Against coherence: Truth probability and justification. Oxford: (...)
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  29. Why coherence is not truth-conducive.Erik J. Olsson - 2001 - Analysis 61 (3):236–241.
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  30.  37
    Coherentism.Erik J. Olsson - 2017 - In Sven Bernecker & Kourken Michaelian (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory. New York: Routledge. pp. 310-322.
  31.  93
    The Moral Argument for God’s Existence; or, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Godless Morality.Erik J. Wielenberg - 2019 - The Philosophers' Magazine 86:93-98.
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  32. The Value of Knowledge.Erik J. Olsson - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (12):874-883.
    A problem occupying much contemporary epistemology is that of explaining why knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief. This paper provides an overview of this debate, starting with historical figures and early work. The contemporary debate in mainstream epistemology is then surveyed and some recent developments that deserve special attention are highlighted, including mounting doubts about the prospects for virtue epistemology to solve the value problem as well as renewed interest in classical and reliabilist‐externalist responses.
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  33.  78
    Reply to Craig, Murphy, McNabb, and Johnson.Erik J. Wielenberg - 2018 - Philosophia Christi 20 (2):365-375.
    In Robust Ethics, I defend a nontheistic version of moral realism according to which moral properties are sui generis, not reducible to other kinds of properties (e.g., natural properties or supernatural properties) and objective morality requires no foundation external to itself. I seek to provide a plausible account of the metaphysics and epistemology of the robust brand of moral realism I favor that draws on both analytic philosophy and contemporary empirical moral psychology. In this paper, I respond to some objections (...)
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  34.  63
    Corroborating testimony, probability and surprise.Erik J. Olsson - 2002 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 53 (2):273-288.
    Jonathan Cohen has claimed that in cases of witness agreement there is an inverse relationship between the prior probability and the posterior probability of what is being agreed: the posterior rises as the prior falls. As is demonstrated in this paper, this contention is not generally valid. In fact, in the most straightforward case exactly the opposite is true: a lower prior also means a lower posterior. This notwithstanding, there is a grain of truth to what Cohen is saying, as (...)
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  35. Difference-Making and Easy Knowledge: Reply to Comesaña and Sartorio.Erik J. Wielenberg - 2015 - Logos and Episteme 6 (1):141-146.
    Juan Comesaña and Carolina Sartorio have recently proposed a diagnosis of what goes wrong in apparently illegitimate cases of ‘bootstrapping’ one’s way toexcessively easy knowledge. They argue that in such cases the bootstrapper bases at least one of her beliefs on evidence that does not evidentially support the proposition believed. I explicate the principle that underlies Comesaña and Sartorio’s diagnosis of such cases and show that their account of what goes wrong in such cases is mistaken.
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  36. An Inconsistency in Craig’s Defence of the Moral Argument.Erik J. Wielenberg - 2012 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 4 (4):49--58.
    I argue that William Craig’s defence of the moral argument is internally inconsistent. In the course of defending the moral argument, Craig criticizes non-theistic moral realism on the grounds that it posits the existence of certain logically necessary connections but fails to provide an adequate account of why such connections hold. Another component of Craig’s defence of the moral argument is an endorsement of a particular version of the divine command theory. Craig’s version of DCT posits certain logically necessary connections (...)
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  37.  7
    Goal Rationality in Science and Technology: An Epistemological Perspective.Erik J. Olsson - 2015 - In Sven Ove Hansson (ed.), The Role of Technology in Science: Philosophical Perspectives. Dordrecht: Springer Verlag.
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  38. Mark Murphy. God and Moral Law: On the Theistic Explanation of Morality. Oxford University Press, 2011.Erik J. Wielenberg - 2014 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 6 (1):199--203.
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  39.  53
    Cohering with.Erik J. Olsson - 1999 - Erkenntnis 50 (2-3):273 - 291.
    I argue that the analysis most capable of systematising our intuitions about coherence as a relation is one according to which a set of beliefs, A, coheres with another set, B, if and only if the set-theoretical union of A and B is a coherent set. The second problem I consider is the role of coherence in epistemic justification. I submit that there are severe problems pertaining to the idea, defended most prominently by Keith Lehrer, that justification amounts to coherence (...)
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  40.  49
    How to Be an Alethically Rational Naturalist.Erik J. Wielenberg - 2002 - Synthese 131 (1):81-98.
    Alvin Plantinga has famously argued that naturalism is self-defeating. Plantinga's argument is, at its heart, an argument from analogy. Plantinga presents various epistemic situations and claims of each that (i) a person in such a situation has an undefeated defeater for each of his beliefs, and (ii) a reflective naturalist is in a relevantly similar situation. I present various epistemic situations and claim of each that a person in such a situation does not have an undefeated defeater for each of (...)
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  41. Kinds of Learning and the Likelihood of Future True Beliefs: Reply to Jäger on Reliabilism and the Value Problem.Erik J. Olsson & Martin Jönsson - 2011 - Theoria 77 (3):214-222.
    We reply to Christoph Jäger's criticism of the conditional probability solution (CPS) to the value problem for reliabilism due to Goldman and Olsson (2009). We argue that while Jäger raises some legitimate concerns about the compatibility of CPS with externalist epistemology, his objections do not in the end reduce the plausibility of that solution.
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  42.  29
    Explicationist Epistemology and Epistemic Pluralism.Erik J. Olsson - 2017 - In Coliva Annalisa & Pedersen Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding (eds.), Epistemic Pluralism. Londra, Regno Unito: Palgrave Macmillan.
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  43.  26
    A diachronic perspective on peer disagreement in veritistic social epistemology.Erik J. Olsson - 2018 - Synthese:1-19.
    The main issue in the epistemology of peer disagreement is whether known disagreement among those who are in symmetrical epistemic positions undermines the rationality of their maintaining their respective views. Douven and Kelp have argued convincingly that this problem is best understood as being about how to respond to peer disagreement repeatedly over time, and that this diachronic issue can be best approached through computer simulation. However, Douven and Kelp’s favored simulation framework cannot naturally handle Christensen’s famous Mental Math example. (...)
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  44.  20
    A diachronic perspective on peer disagreement in veritistic social epistemology.Erik J. Olsson - 2018 - Synthese 197 (10):4475-4493.
    The main issue in the epistemology of peer disagreement is whether known disagreement among those who are in symmetrical epistemic positions undermines the rationality of their maintaining their respective views. Douven and Kelp have argued convincingly that this problem is best understood as being about how to respond to peer disagreement repeatedly over time, and that this diachronic issue can be best approached through computer simulation. However, Douven and Kelp’s favored simulation framework cannot naturally handle Christensen’s famous Mental Math example. (...)
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  45. The new paradox of the stone revisited.Erik J. Wielenberg - 2001 - Faith and Philosophy 18 (2):261-268.
    Alfred Mele and M.P. Smith have presented a puzzle about omnipotence which they call “the new paradox of the stone.” They have also proposed a solution to this puzzle. I briefly present their puzzle and their proposed solution and argue that their proposed solution is unsatisfactory. I further argue that if their suggested solution to the original paradox of the stone succeeds, a similar solution also solves the new paradox of the stone.
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  46.  13
    Belief Revision, Rational Choice and the Unity of Reason.Erik J. Olsson - 2003 - Studia Logica 73 (2):219-240.
    Hans Rott has argued, most recently in his book Change, Choice and Inference, that certain formal correspondences between belief revision and rational choice have important philosophical implications, claiming that the former strongly indicate the unity of practical and theoretical reason as well as the primacy of practical reason. In this paper, I confront Rott's argument with three serious challenges. My conclusion is that, while Rott's work is indisputable as a formal achievement, the philosophical consequences he wants to draw are not (...)
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  47.  47
    F. P. Ramsey on knowledge and fallibilism.Erik J. Olsson - 2004 - Dialectica 58 (4):549–557.
    The paper deals mainly with two problems in the epistemology of Frank Plumpton Ramsey. One concerns his account of knowledge, the other his fallibilism. I argue that Ramsey failed to make room for the social aspect of knowledge and, furthermore, that he did not separate the fallibility of our view from its corrigibility. My positive proposal is to combine social reliabilism and corrigibilism with a rejection of fallibilism.
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  48.  7
    The Science of Chinese Buddhism: Early Twentieth-Century Engagements.Erik J. Hammerstrom - 2015 - Cambridge University Press.
    _Kexue_, or science, captured the Chinese imagination in the early twentieth century, promising new knowledge about the world and a dynamic path to prosperity. Chinese Buddhists embraced scientific language and ideas to carve out a place for their religion within a rapidly modernizing society. Examining dozens of previously unstudied writings from the Chinese Buddhist press, this book maps Buddhists' efforts to rethink their traditions through science in the initial decades of the twentieth century. Buddhists believed science offered an exciting, alternative (...)
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  49.  62
    Engel vs. Rorty on truth.Erik J. Olsson - 2017 - Synthese 194 (5).
    My concern in this paper is a debate between Pascal Engel and Richard Rorty documented in the book What’s the Use of Truth? Both Engel and Rorty problematize the natural suggestion that attaining truth is a goal of our inquiries. Where Rorty thinks this means that truth is not something we should aim for at all over and beyond justification, Engel maintains that truth still plays a distinct role in our intellectual and daily lives. Thus, the debate between Engel and (...)
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  50.  76
    Reply to Kvanvig on the Swamping Problem.Erik J. Olsson - 2011 - Social Epistemology 25 (2):173 - 182.
    According to the so?called swamping problem, reliabilist knowledge is no more valuable than mere true belief. In a paper called ?Reliabilism and the value of knowledge? (in Epistemic value, edited by A. Haddock, A. Millar, and D. H. Pritchard, pp. 19?41. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), Alvin I. Goldman and myself proposed, among other things, a solution based on conditional probabilities. This approach, however, is heavily criticized by Jonathan L. Kvanvig in his paper ?The swamping problem redux: Pith and gist? (...)
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